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Comments on The Morality of Freedom 
Joseph Raz1 
 
Anyone older than forty must be aware how odd it feels to imagine, perhaps 
aided by contemporary home movies, what one was like thirty years before. 
The more important were those past days for one’s future the odder it is to 
think of them now. One comes to them with the hindsight of their 
consequences, whereas one lived through them minded of the reality that they 
changed, and which now resists memory. 
Not being a reader of my own writings, revisiting a thirty-year-old book of 
mine brings similar feelings. I would not have ventured to re-encounter my 
book but for the stimulation of and the lessons I learnt from the comments 
published in this volume, and from discussions in the conference in which they 
were first presented. As often, I admire the care with which the contributors 
read the book, and their ability to express some of its ideas better than I 
managed. Their observations and criticism taught me more than will be evident 
from my brief reflections that follow. This is largely because I thought it best 
not to enter into detailed discussion of their contributions, but to offer a 
reflection about the book which is largely inspired by them, and engages with 
their observations, often by implication, sometimes directly.  
I do not wish to defend the book; not because it is indefensible nor because it 
needs no defence. It was launched all that time ago to fare on its own. I was 
not then, and am certainly not now, best qualified to explain and defend its 
theses. If there is some good in it, that is because its ideas may spark others, 
inviting development and interpretation in various, possibly diverging, 
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 2 
directions. Defending it, especially if successful, may even be counter-
productive, discouraging people from developing their ideas on its foundations. 
Needless to say the welcome possibility that the book (as I will refer to The 
Morality of Freedom) may trigger comments and interpretations that modify 
and contextualise its content indicates that it was never thought to be the final 
word on anything. Put aside the obvious possibility that it may stimulate people 
to make significant contributions simply by becoming aware of mistakes made 
in it. Generally, we do not hope to enrich understanding by making mistakes 
that will be corrected. But we may and should aim to improve understanding 
by advancing sensible ideas that can be improved upon. There are at least two 
ways in which a work can be developed and improved, even by later work by 
its author, without imputing to it mistakes. Both result from the fact that 
whatever we say is said in a context. First, a book is intended to solve some 
problems, but there are others that were not, sometimes could not be in the 
mind of the writer, and are not solved by what he wrote. Their solution may 
not only be consistent with the views of the book. It may cohere with its 
general approach. Second, the language used in advancing the book’s theses 
was chosen in light of sensible (I am assuming) expectations about how it is 
likely to be understood by the probable audience, but that same language may 
be misunderstood by others, who come to the text from a different 
background and with different preoccupations. In connecting the book’s theses 
to wider concerns, showing how it fits in within a broader outlook, one can 
build on it, even in far reaching ways, without contradicting it. 
In that way, people may find the book’s relation to various cultural and other 
phenomena interesting, even while aware that the author was not thinking 
about them. They may relate the book to such phenomena, pointing out its 
limitations, or its potential to shed light on matters not directly discussed in it. 
Avishai Margalit’s discussion of personal autonomy does, among other things, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857419 
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just that. It relates the book, or an aspect of it, to other cultural traditions 
about autonomy, about manipulation, about the meaning one may find in one’s 
life. The first way mentioned above in which the book is not meant to be the 
final word is perhaps best illustrated by Daniel Viehoff’s comment. The views 
about authority the book advances were prompted by a puzzle: how can one 
person’s or institution’s words intended to bind people actually bind those 
people, especially other people? There are many other questions to ask about 
authority, many that I did not deal with. Some of them have been presented as 
objections to the account of authority I give, whereas in fact they do no more 
than underline the point I make, namely that the account is very abstract and 
further moral principles have to be invoked to show how it applies in more 
specific political contexts. Others are supposed to be counter-examples, that is 
cases where on my account there is or there is no authority whereas the 
objectors think otherwise. Such objections may reflect a difference of opinion 
not about the nature of authority, but about other matters, e.g. about the 
duties that people have when they live in societies of one character or 
another. According to the Service Account (as I call my account of authority) 
difference of opinions about people’s moral duties often generates difference 
of opinions about the conditions under which institutions have legitimate 
authority. The issue that Viehoff addresses results from a different kind of 
objection, one that ignores the ordinary meaning of the language in which the 
Service Account is couched and focusses exclusively on those parts of it that 
can be presented in a more formulaic way, i.e. the parts of it that I emphasised, 
given the difficulty that I aimed to overcome: how one agent’s say-so can bind 
another. He shows how these objections disappear once one considers other 
elements implicit in the account, and in doing so he enriches the Service 
Account and makes it more complete. 
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What motivated the book? What would it be good to think were among its 
motivating impulses? An important motivation, which is attested right at the 
beginning, was to avoid adherence to a party; to deflate the importance of any 
resemblance to a party or a school. Far too many philosophical publications 
are concerned not with which ideas are sound, or what arguments are good, 
but whether this or that author or this or that publication belongs or does not 
belong with some school of thought. To mention but one example: much 
writing in political philosophy is preoccupied with establishing the credentials, 
or lack thereof, of a writer as a liberal, or a political liberal. I secretly enjoyed 
reactions to the book that condemned it for not being true to liberalism. 
Were they condemning liberalism as a mistaken political theory (exposed as 
such by the book)? No, the comment appeared to be made by people for 
whom party credentials were what mattered most. 
I do not believe that liberalism is (or contains) a political theory or family of 
theories united by shared core doctrines. Theories commonly identified as 
liberal diverge on many central issues, and resemble non-liberal theories (that 
is ones that are not commonly classified as liberal) on other issues. Liberalism 
is best understood as a historical phenomenon identified by lines of historical 
development, by cross references that express the appeal that some writers 
had for others, and often by a common temperament. 
I wish I had been equally successful in avoiding falling into someone else’s 
agenda, which one may innocently do by starting to use – in order not to be a 
pedant, to facilitate communication, etc. – a term introduced by another 
writer. By using that term one may be caught up for ever in disputes framed by 
the presuppositions of that other writer and those interested in his work, and 
which one finds alien to one’s own way of conceiving the underlying issues. All 
of this happened to me because I used the term ‘perfectionism’. I even earned 
an unsought after position, a location on a Rawlsian inspired map of the world, 
 5 
having become a Perfectionist Liberal. This brought some of the benefits of 
moderate fame: those inclined to study political doctrines guided by the 
Rawlsian map had now to footnote my own spot on that map. In fact, there is 
no such spot: there is no sensible content to the idea of Perfectionist 
Liberalism, other than that the term can be used to indicate that the writer or 
the work does not support Rawls’ own version of the justification of political 
doctrines that should govern life in societies like ours. My views do indeed 
differ from his in this respect, but the intimation of some positive doctrines 
carried by ‘perfectionism’ are chimerical. 
There is another feature of some contemporary political writing, possibly 
exemplified most clearly in some writings in the liberal tradition, that I was 
determined to avoid. It can be called the Hubris of the Moderns – the belief 
that some commendable features of some contemporary political 
arrangements are necessary for any political society to be morally decent, to 
conform to minimal standards of moral acceptability. My thought was that 
what matters in political arrangements is the degree to which they enable and 
facilitate having a fulfilling, rewarding life and avoid excluding people from their 
protection and benefits, as well as avoid repression of basic human needs. One 
of the main theses argued for in the book is that the availability of options 
whose embrace can lead to or constitutes part of a successful life, is provided 
by the socially defined opportunities and forms of life available in the societies 
in which we live, and in socially permitted access to them. If this is so then if 
people can have a successful life in some societies, that is due to those 
societies’ social organisation (and only partly due to attempts to fight and 
change it). I also think that whatever the imperfections of their societies, many 
people who have lived throughout human history were able to have rewarding 
lives, and therefore that whatever the imperfections of their societies quite a 
few of them met at least minimal conditions of permissibility. I also believe that 
 6 
most societies, including liberal democracies, today have repressive features 
and exclude various groups from participation in valuable options to a degree 
that makes them seriously morally defective. Hence my, admittedly 
controversial, views about the Hubris of the Moderns, which are manifested in 
many aspects of the book, and very clearly in its contention that personal 
autonomy, which is so vital for the possibility of rewarding life in many 
societies today, was not always so important. More fundamentally, the 
arguments for value pluralism, for a plurality of ways in which one may have a 
rewarding life, was fundamental in preparing the way to the rejection of the 
Hubris of the Moderns.  
The sentiments and ambitions to which I here confess are both common and 
controversial among writers on political philosophy, or at least the way I tried 
to pursue them is. For example, it seemed clear that in public political rhetoric 
many terms are validly and effectively used not because of their cognitive 
content, not because they invoke doctrines of political action or organisation, 
but because of their emotional force, and their invocation of historical events, 
aspirations, or because they signal identification with broad political 
movements that one trusts or distrusts, etc. Rhetorical discourse is particularly 
helpful when one of the functions of the discourse is to distinguish friend from 
foe, to reassure, to encourage one to stand with one’s friends and so on. In 
philosophical discussions there is a case for limiting the role of rhetorical 
discourse and for signalling locations of its occurrence relatively clearly, in 
order to isolate it from much of the argumentation for or against various 
views. This helps to avoid prettifying talk and myth-making.  
The appeal to an ideal of Equality is a prime case in point. I tried to show how 
so far as the concept of equality is concerned it can be invoked in support of 
various principles of entitlement, indeed in connection with various principles 
that have some truth in them, that is principles that state pro tanto reasons, 
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that are true when applied to some contexts. In fact, ‘equality’ is used in 
connection with some principles but not at all with others. For its use is 
determined by historical and rhetorical reasons. I bolstered that point by 
explaining the structure of principles of entitlement that indicate concern for 
equality that is not merely rhetorical.  It was my view that sound principles of 
this latter kind are not among the more fundamental moral or political 
principles. This is of course a non-existence claim: There are no sound 
fundamental principles of equality. Such claims are hard to prove, and I 
certainly did not, and did not claim to have proved it. I attempted to make it 
plausible by explaining how some unsound principles are plausible only if 
supplemented by principles of (non-rhetorical) equality. Once one realises that 
those principles are not sound the inclination to endorse those principles of 
equality is undermined.2 They are no longer required: their work, I wrote, is 
done without them and they are mere decorations. Michael Otsuka is right to 
point out that that last point is false. One way in which it is false is that there 
are circumstances in which non-rhetorical egalitarian principles make a 
difference even within ethical outlooks that avoid those unsound theories. 
Some of the correct points made by Otsuka in this regard do not undermine 
my argument. Because it is not meant to be a proof of anything, it need not 
cover all logical possibilities. It has to apply only to conditions likely in our 
circumstances, for the aim is to persuade people out of belief in fundamental 
non-rhetorical equality principles by showing that the ethical beliefs they hold 
are vindicated by sound moral principles that do not include principles of non-
rhetorical equality. But other of his points do undercut my case. For example, 
a particularly regrettable oversight of mine was the failure to see that even if 
                                        
2  Steiner’s argument in favour of the value of equality mentioned by Sharon is, in a way, an 
example: I do not wish to allow that his argument from the value of negative liberty to the value of 
equality in its distribution is valid. However, his misconception of the value of liberty , which 
undermines his argument about the value of negative liberty, makes its implications for equality 
irrelevant.  
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when sound principles are completely realised they (trivially) achieve equality 
(what I call by-product equality) it does not follow that the degree of advancing 
towards their full realisation is matched by the degree of advance towards 
equality. Therefore, those who believe in non-rhetorical equality may differ 
from those who don’t about the way to progress closer to complete 
realisation of those principles. The second way in which my claim was false, or 
at least exaggerated, is that, as Otsuka remarks, my arguments cannot hope to 
account for all ethical beliefs people have, especially not for their beliefs about 
the desirability of equality. This is consistent with the aim of the arguments: in 
the conditions of our life whatever equality people believe in is unlikely to be 
achieved in practice. Practical ethical debates are usually about the desirability 
of reducing inequalities of certain kinds (and about what kinds of inequalities 
matter). My argument in the book was that reducing these inequalities is, for 
the most part, justified without invoking equality. That leaves unresolved 
disagreement about what is the ideal situation. On this I was hoping to 
convince some people to change their views. In this regard both Otsuka and 
Asaf Sharon have a point when they say that I beg the question against non-
rhetorical egalitarians. The point is not that I beg the question against them. It 
is that I do not offer an argument for the non-existence of sound ethical 
outlooks in which non-rhetorical egalitarian principles are fundamental. I rely 
on good sense in identifying some of the considerations that can make non-
rhetorical egalitarian principles attractive, and showing that they do not lead to 
fundamental egalitarian principles. I think that these observations were basically 
sound, though I would have expressed them differently had I written the book 
today.  That I failed to convince many, including Sharon3 and Otsuka, does not 
                                        
3  I suspect that Sharon’s views and mine share much, especially because he looks for principles 
of more limited scope among which he finds sound principles of equality. Once we locate equality in 
specific contingent contexts we encounter many sound concerns for equality of treatment and many 
for curtailing the acceptable range of inequality in distribution, based on both consequentialist and 
non-consequentialist considerations. 
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show otherwise. Attempts at persuasion of my kind cannot convince everyone. 
Possibly they are the best we can do when faced with the suspicion that a 
putative value is in fact illusory, that whatever good is claimed for it is no good 
or is due to some other value. But even if this is the best form of argument it 
requires different examples, different arguments for different people, given the 
variety of their other beliefs and temperaments.4 
Arudra Burra mentions that when the book offers an account of concepts the 
accounts are theory driven, and are not meant to be accounts of the meaning 
of the term(s) we use to express the concept. I was rather opaque about the 
way such ‘conceptual accounts’ are justified, and therefore rather vague about 
what sort of claims they make. While this is not the place for an extensive 
discussion of the matter I will essay a few observations that may clarify matters 
somewhat, and that are relevant, in various ways, when assessing the 
comments contributed here by Burra, Margalit, Sharon and Japa Pallikkathayil.  
The meaning of a word is its contribution to the content of an utterance in 
which it features, when it is used correctly. Rules of meaning, in other words, 
spell out how to use the words whose meaning they specify in order to make 
utterances with a certain content (and depending on one’s semantic theory: 
force, resonance, etc.). The words used to express concepts whose 
clarification is of philosophical interest are also used in many other ways. So 
that explanations of their meanings explain too much (their contribution in 
other contexts) and too little (they are unlikely to help with the philosophical 
elucidation of the concepts even when dealing with the use of the words 
expressing them in a philosophically relevant context). 
                                        
4  One claim by Otsuka surprised me. I cannot see why he thinks that it is a criticism of my 
views that they do not enable one to distinguish between the one and two child cases in the way 
that he does. My views may entail something about the two child case, and they entail nothing 
regarding the single child case, and thus they enable one to reach different conclusions about the 
two cases. Naturally one would not reach them the way that a non-rhetorical egalitarian like Otsuka 
does. 
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So what am I, and others, trying to do? We identify a range of phenomena that 
have some puzzling aspects, and offer explanations that dissolve the puzzles. As 
already mentioned, one of my puzzles was how can people create duties, or 
more broadly, normative reasons by expressing an intention to do so (there 
are of course conflicting accounts of the puzzling phenomena, e.g., some 
people think that these reasons are generated by intending to generate them. 
So there is also an argument about that issue, but leave that on one side here). 
The phenomena affected by this puzzle divide into at least two classes, 
depending whether the reasons apply to their creators, as in decisions or 
promises, or to others. I have argued that there are two different explanations 
of the puzzle in these two cases, though both share some formal features. 
Given that a central case of so generating reasons for others is that of 
authorities, the explanation of that part of the puzzle became an account of 
authorities (through being an account of legitimate authorities).  
However, not all authorities are of this kind, or if you like, the word ‘authority’ 
applies to various other phenomena as well. Given that those other 
phenomena do not raise the same puzzle, and given that the ability to generate 
reasons in this way appears to play an important role in human life, it seemed 
sensible to focus on that type of authority. Not to denigrate the others, but 
simply because there is something of importance to say about this kind of 
authority.  
That is not the end of the story. But I will add only one point: we employ, in 
our reflections, plans and intentions, many concepts derived from different 
religious, philosophical and other cultural traditions. I share with many who 
write on these topics the dual ambition of, first, focussing on some of those 
concepts that are, taken together, powerful enough to enable rich reflection, 
planning etc. while avoiding others, primarily because they appear to be mired 
beyond redemption in false ideas, or ethically objectionable outlooks. Second, 
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to make clear their interrelations, to make explicit the inferential relations 
between them. 
These remarks bear on the character of arguments for and against various 
normative theses. They indicate, for example, that arguments from counter-
examples require much more than producing a counter-example (or if a 
counter-example is understood as a successful counter-example then they 
require more than producing a putative counter-example). A claim that (the 
concept) C is defined by conditions i to n, may be true even if there are 
statements, properly made with the use of (the word) ‘c’, that show that it is 
proper to use ‘c’ even when those conditions are not met. Such counter-
examples may damage claims about the meaning of ‘c’, but my discussion (like 
many others in philosophy) is not about the meaning of any word, and need 
not be affected by the existence of the counter-example unless it shows a use 
of ‘c’ in a context relevant to the thesis about C. Furthermore, it is no simple 
matter to judge whether the counter-example is relevant. To review the 
situation: There is a wide range of phenomena that ‘c’ is properly used to talk 
about; its boundaries will not be agreed to by all, but theoretical 
considerations may help to delineate some of its boundaries. However, in 
advancing theses that determine the content of a concept C one is identifying a 
range that is both unified and significant in its role in life, and in the intellectual 
challenges that it presents. That may well leave out perfectly legitimate uses of 
‘c’, and as the basis for leaving them out is judgement about importance or 
significance, practical and theoretical, the matter may well be controversial. 
Many putative counter-examples are not successful in undermining the account 
of the concept, but they underline the need for a good case for the disputed 
views that lead to their exclusion.  
Let me again illustrate the point by drawing on my concern with the intentional 
creation of reasons: Promises, I argued, are obligations created by the 
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promisor by communicating an intention to create them by that very act of 
communication. Not all promises are like that. If Anne tells Bob: ‘the next time 
you do that I’ll break your bones’, she does not undertake an obligation to do 
so. Some promises are not undertaken obligations, but threats. But that does 
not invalidate my account of promising. It is not about the meaning of 
‘promises’, it does not deny that one can use ‘promise’ to threaten. It focuses 
on a different range of uses of the term, which arguably are more important 
and more puzzling. 
Finally, it is crucial that theses about a concept are part of (an incomplete) 
attempt to analyse and map the generality of concepts that are important in 
normative reflection on any matter. Part of the case for theses about a single 
concept is that they clarify its relations to other concepts, thus contributing to 
generating such a map. That imposes constraints on the theses and the case for 
them, constraints that strengthen them. One such constraint is in the 
interdependence of apparently distinct theses. Whether the service conception 
does justice to practical authority depends, e.g., on whether my account of 
what makes a life go well for the person whose life it is is along the right lines. 
Failure in one area may undermine success in another. On the other hand, 
mistaken assumptions about one concept may undermine a criticism of theses 
regarding another concept.  Burra’s paper repeatedly draws attention to the 
fact that putative counter-examples are not necessarily successful counter-
examples. He also brings out another phenomenon that is even clearer in 
Pallikkathayil’s paper. The inter-dependence of the accounts of different 
concepts may make one feel, when thinking of one of them, that the account, 
even though true, falls short of providing enough information or did not offer 
the right explanation. Typical were responses to the service account by those 
complaining that they still do not know who has legitimate authority. It seems 
to me likely that some of the critics of my account of rights, as well as suffering 
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(as Pallikkathayil points out) from incomplete reading of the account, also felt 
that something is missing. In a way they are right, there is much that is missing. 
What is probably not missing is an account that identifies rights and connects 
them to other normative concepts: what is good for a person, duties, 
justification. A good example is Pallikkathayil’s criticism of my account of 
parental rights:  
‘A parent may, for example, have a right against others’ interference 
with her parenting choices (at least for a certain range of choices).  
What explains this right?  I am tempted to think that it is explained 
by the duty parents have to raise their children, a duty they can only 
successfully satisfy without such interference.  Now, as I have just 
pointed out, it is entirely plausible that parents’[sic] have an interest 
in being able to satisfy their parental duties.  So, I am not claiming 
that Raz’s account has no explanation of this parental right.  Instead, 
I am claiming that it is the wrong explanation.  The right protects 
parents’ ability to fulfill their duties.  Describing the right as instead 
responsive to the interest parents have in fulfilling their duties 
unnecessarily obscures the object and purpose of the right. ’ 
The difference between our views is not great. It is not that I give a different 
explanation of or ground for parental rights. Rather, I contend for an additional 
step in the argument that explains their existence: Parental duties establish an 
interest in being able to discharge them that is the ground of a right parents 
have to the means that facilitate discharging the duties (a duly qualified right) 
and that gives Jamie’s parents the derivative right (for example) to tell Miki’s 
parents not to expose Jamie to some dangerous chemicals.  
Is the extra step needed? Is it ever mentioned or in the thought of parents 
when discussing such rights? Of course it is: ‘I must be able to do what I have a 
duty to do’, ‘I cannot be left with a duty that I am unable to fulfil’, and similarly 
phrased thoughts are in their mind whenever there is a doubt about their 
rights. They manifest the thought that they are personally wronged if denied a 
way to discharge their duty. It is worth remembering here that while parental 
duties are a burden, they, like duties generally, are not only a burden. They 
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indicate that the parents have responsibilities and are entrusted with tasks that 
they are proud to have, that sometimes they have children partly in order to 
have those tasks. Their standing in their own eyes and in the eyes of others is 
affected by their attitudes to those duties and responsibilities. They have a 
powerful interest in being able to do well in fulfilling these responsibilities. One 
need not disagree with Pallikkathayil that sometimes focussing on that side of 
the picture may divert attention from the other side – the connection between 
the rights to the duties towards the children and the welfare of the children. 
But the fact that sometimes it is best not to mention the parental interest does 
not mean that it does not play a role in justifying the right.  
I suspect that many of the criticisms of my account of rights, though not all, 
derive from a blinkered view of what rights are, much of it inspired by a 
Kantian sentiment, leading to an exaggerated view of rights. Many rights are 
pretty ordinary, mundane affairs, like a right to cut off branches overhanging 
my land, and many are held by corporations and other entities that have 
nothing like the dignity or worth that humans are supposed to have, and they 
do not all derive from some important rights related to human dignity or the 
like. Many rights derive from duties, functions, purposes, like the rights of 
public bodies (which are subject to conditions and qualifications) to take 
actions necessary for the discharge of their duties or the pursuit of the 
purposes they were entrusted with. What some critics have in mind are 
features that belong with some classes of rights and are not shared by all 
classes, not being essential features of rights. 
Given all these points, is there a case to describe theses and arguments of this 
kind as offering conceptual analysis? Yes and No. The more straightforward the 
argument for an account is, the stronger the case for regarding it as an account 
of an existing concept. For there is a strong argument to say that the account 
brings to light a distinction that people generally, or a significant sub-
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population, actually deploy, and that plays a role of some importance in their 
thinking. The more complex the argument for an account the more it relies on 
disputed views, and the weaker is the case for regarding it as no more than an 
explanation of an existing concept. However, if it is a sound argument it has a 
claim to be a reforming or a creative case for a concept, albeit not one widely 
recognised. Either way, even when the account does little more than elucidate 
a generally used concept, the case for the account does not rely on it being an 
explanation of an existing concept. 
So far I have not mentioned Jonathan Quong’s comment. It belongs to a 
different world. Reading it I sometimes feel that I live, or think I do, in a 
different world from the one he inhabits. Or perhaps, that he believes that 
people regularly have emotions and attitudes that I think are had only 
occasionally. In thinking about his comment I avoid using the terms ‘liberalism’ 
‘perfectionism’ and ‘anti-perfectionism’. Even though his comment pivots on 
them, I think (for reasons sketched earlier) that no content is lost, and some 
clarity is gained by avoiding them. 
What exercises Quong is the possibility of some people having to live and act 
under rules that they disagree with. He introduces us to that possibility by 
telling us of a philosophy department in which ‘some faculty members must 
subordinate their convictions about the nature of philosophy to the 
justification of the department’s rules, but others will not have to do so’ 
(because they agree with the rules). So phrased you may think that he is not so 
much exercised by people having to ‘subordinate their convictions’ and apply 
rules they disagree with, as by the fact that only some have to do so. However, 
Quong’s worries are unlikely to be put to rest if all members of the 
department have to ‘subordinate their convictions’ in that way, for example, if 
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they cannot change rules that were laid down in long forgotten times.5 I should 
make it clear that Quong’s comment is an argument that we have a strong 
reason (I am not sure how strong he thinks it is) to avoid such subordination 
in some cases only. But there is something in his terminology that suggests a 
sentiment that finds subordination of one’s convictions undesirable in itself. I 
find the need to live under rules one disagrees with to be a precondition of any 
social life in the contemporary world, and thus while not necessarily something 
to be desired for its own sake, at least something which the capacity to adjust 
to is highly praiseworthy. 
I am yet to identify any philosophical disagreement with Quong.6 I do not find 
it easy to do, mainly because so much appears to turn on factual 
disagreements. For example, he introduces his argument with the following 
factual observations: 
Disagreements about ideals are widespread and sharp. They 
threaten to make mutually advantageous forms of cooperative life 
difficult or even impossible. Appropriate political institutions and rules 
can be at least a partial solution to this problem by serving as an 
impartial framework to resolve certain disputes. 
Agreed. And it has to be added that some societies are led to internal conflicts 
that make their continued existence undesirable. Partition or some other 
transformation of their identity may be the only reasonable escape from their 
plight. Interestingly, in some cases when partitions do occur the differences in 
                                        
5  Quong explicitly denies that equality plays no role in his argument. He claims to have an 
intuition that the case in which everyone is subjecting their judgement is better (at least in one 
respect) than the case he describes, because there is no inequality. By now the reader would know 
that I have no such intuition and would have regarded it as false had I had it. Still, it is true that 
Quong’s argument invokes an equality concern; that is how it is presented: ‘But in the version of the 
department we have been imagining, the department’s rules and institutions are designed in a way 
that does not offer anything like the equal protection of this interest for its members. Some 
members will have this interest perfectly protected, whereas this interest for other members of the 
department is entirely thwarted.’ He invokes equality, but he invokes it in defence of – what I will 
claim – is a non-existing interest. As I argued in the book: if one starts with false principles it may be 
that they entice one towards some equality principles. 
6  He has an intuition that I do not have, but that is hardly a philosophical disagreement. 
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ideals between the two new countries (when ideals are understood to exclude 
the desire to separate and be independent, and closely related aspirations) are 
much smaller than the divisions inside the two resulting countries. All manner 
of historical memories, physical and economic circumstances, emotional 
reactions and symbolic associations are most powerful in keeping societies 
together, as well as in driving them apart. That is consistent with differences in 
ideals having an impact. What is worrying is not concern about ways to 
ameliorate the damage such differences may make, but the exaggeration of the 
role such differences sometimes play in social life, to the extent of appearing to 
exclude all other factors. 
 Suppose we face countries, like the US, whose people strongly prefer to keep 
together, whose identity is sustained by a powerful sentiment of national pride, 
perhaps made possible by a distorted view of their history. How should they 
confront their disagreements about ideals? One is inclined to say that anything, 
which is not morally objectionable, may help them. It may be pride in their 
sporting achievements, pride in their military might, which is the fear and envy 
of the world (though whether this is morally acceptable may be questionable). 
It may be the prospect of economic improvement to oneself and one’s 
offspring, which overshadows any religious reservations about the character of 
one’s society, or it may be a realisation that raising certain issues, however 
fundamental they are among one’s ideals, would cause aggravation and strife 
without doing any good. It is significant that in western societies most people 
are aware that their most basic and cherished ideals are not realised and are 
unlikely to be realised in their lifetime or any time soon afterwards. They, for 
the most part, without much awareness of the fact, reconcile themselves with 
how thing are, because of what has been achieved in their country and for 
themselves, and try to improve conditions, within the range of the possible. 
Differences, including the deepest differences and disappointment about failure 
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to realise their ideals, are often dormant, if only for lack of a rational way to 
make progress with their realisation. Repressive societies are those that block 
all or most important avenues for amelioration, not those – which include all 
of them – in which full realisation is impossible. It is true that even in non-
repressive societies waves of insistence on full realisation of some ideals, best 
known to us as waves of radicalisation and extremism, do occur, sometimes 
incited by self-interested bodies, sometimes for more complex causes. They do 
face governments, however enlightened, with very hard choices. What is clear 
is that the solution is not to give way, and that change in the principles 
governing the public domain plays only a limited, though sometimes vital, part 
in overcoming such waves. 
Quong may be aware of all this. But he is disturbed by the fact that when social 
peace and a modicum of social harmony is attained in such ways it still involves 
some people accommodating themselves to being subject to rules they 
disagree with. And it does indeed involve that. Two aspects of contemporary 
life are relevant here. First, most people who live under rules that they 
disagree with and most of the people who, regarding some such rules, deeply 
mind that fact, disagree mostly not with the rules by which decisions are 
socially or legally taken, but with some of the results of the use of these rules, 
that is some of the rules that were decided upon in accordance with rules 
about how to take decisions that they do agree with. Second, even though they 
all regret that they live under rules that they think are wrong or unjust, etc. 
what they regret is being wronged or being subjected to injustice. Compared 
with that the fact that they personally disagree with the rules is relatively 
insignificant. Moreover, they have an interest not to live under those rules only 
if they really are wronged by them or subjected to injustice through them. 
They all, if rational, implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that if they are 
mistaken, and if the rules are justified, and worse still, if repealing them would 
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wrong either themselves or others or would be unjust either to themselves or 
to others, then it is a good thing that they are subjected to these rules even 
though they are of the (mistaken) opinion that the rules are bad or wrong.7 
Therefore, people do not think that an arbiter is partial just because he has 
reached a decision which favours one side in a dispute over the other. They 
know that the impartial arbiter is the unbiased one, and that in many disputes 
one side is right and the other not, so that his task is to find for the one who is 
in the right. There is much more to discuss: what of disputes where there is no 
right or wrong, or where each side is partly right, or where there are many 
dimensions to the disputes, or where humane concerns arise because one side 
is so often in the wrong that its self-respect is undermined etc. But they take 
us beyond the current discussion.  
Does Quong’s paper disclose any philosophical disagreement? I am still not 
clear. The disagreement about what constitutes impartiality may well turn out 
to be terminological, though behind that there may be a philosophical 
disagreement of an unidentified content. The disagreement about what 
interests people have is at least half factual, though it may also be philosophical 
with moral implications. 
 
                                        
7  Yes, I am claiming that Quong has not identified an interest that people have in not 
subordinating their judgement. There are, of course, in cases like that of the philosophy department, 
real human interests. I have ignored them because Quong does. But it is not only about what is 
philosophy and what is rubbish. It is also a matter of the livelihood, respect and life prospects of 
people who sincerely believed that their brand of alchemy will produce gold. They do not have the 
right to practise alchemy just because otherwise they will have to practise chemistry. But their 
genuine needs should not be ignored. I changed from philosophy and pretend philosophy to 
chemistry and alchemy because Quong presents the dispute as if it is of this character. It rarely is 
that kind of dispute in philosophical departments, but it came close to that in countries in which for 
dozens of year the only philosophy permitted to be taught was Marxism and variants or derivatives 
of it. When that period ended, the sitting professors found themselves in something similar to a 
Quongian dilemma. If they were not fired they were required to teach Hume and other 
philosophical writings which they did not want and were not qualified to do. That was no reason to 
deny their university the teaching of the great philosophers. But it presented the human dilemma 
that I mentioned. 
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